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The governance and management of water use in the
United States generally, and in southern California in
particular, are not organized as an ideal legal-rational
centralized administration or as a perfectly competitive
private market. This fact poses challenges to analysis that
the local public economies (LPE) framework developed at the
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis helps to
resolve.
The LPE framework enlarges the possibilities for
descriptive and prescriptive analysis of interorganizational
relations. It is based on the idea that an understanding of
current arrangements is an important prerequisite to the
issuance of prescriptions for reform. That view, which has
informed work on metropolitan area governmental organization
(e.g., ACIR, 1987), suggests that analysts "begin to search
for the nature of the order which exists in the complex of
relationships among governmental units and abandon the
assumption that all of these relationships are unique or
random." By searching for "the nature of the order which
exists" and "an analysis of how the system works," (Ostrom
and Ostrom, 1965: 138) one can arrive at descriptions of
current arrangements. Discussion of shortcomings and
recommendations for improvements can follow, while the
ultimate evaluations of the performance of public officials
and governmental structures are left to citizens.
A Complex Water Economy
The LPE-derived concept of a complex and regulated
water economy helps us understand the roles and
relationships of the diverse organizations involved in water
management in the United States. That complex water economy
is composed of providers, producers, importers, wholesalers,
retailers, and regulators.
When the organizing concept of a complex water economy,
composed of providers and producers, importers, wholesalers,
retailers, and regulators is applied to the management of
water supplies in the United States, patterns of
organizational development and of inter-organizational
relationships begin to emerge that contribute to an
understanding of the actual operation of this complex system
that involves literally hundreds of thousands of entities,
private and public, local, state, and national. It is, in
fact, an organizing concept without which much of the
activity involved in the provision and production of all
kinds of services and commodities in the United States would
be nearly incomprehensible.
In fact, the complex water economy in the United States
may involve thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of
organizations and relationships, yet not be beyond
comprehension. Some organizations are providers of water,
others are producers of water, others may be both, and there
are many provider-producer relationships.
The LPE distinction between the provision of a service
or commodity and the production of a service or commodity
(U.S. ACIR, 1987) is crucial for understanding the water
economy. The provision of a service or commodity involves
the set of decisions concerning the amount and quality that
will be provided, at what costs, how the incidence of costs
will be distributed among the users of that service or
commodity — in sum, the set of decisions translating
preferences for the service or commodity into demand
articulations to be satisfied by supply acquisition. The
production of a service or commodity involves the set of
decisions for acquiring and mixing production inputs in
order to generate production outputs (services or
commodities).
Provision and production decisions may be made and
executed by the same organization or by different
organizations. An organization may provide services or
commodities that it does not produce. An organization in
the "water supply industry" (for example, a general-purpose
or a special-purpose local government) may provide water
supply to its residents but do so by acquiring all or part
of its supply from water that is actually produced by some
other entity.
Overlaid on the provider-producer distinction is the
difference in an economy between importers, wholesalers, and
retailers. These are functional differentiations and
relationships that are not surprising when found in the
analysis of other sectors of the economy, and they are also
found in the water economy of the United States. Some
organizations import water to areas where it is in demand.
Others function as wholesalers, providing water supplies to
more than one retail client organization. Retailers
distribute water supplies directly to water users.
Some water wholesalers may be water producers as well
as providers; others may be providers only, purchasing
imported water supplies and then distributing them among
retailers. Similarly, retailers may directly produce the
water they sell to users, purchase it from wholesalers and
deliver it to residents, or operate with some mix of these
methods.
Regulatory functions, to oversee the operation of water
suppliers and ensure safety to users, may be performed by
still other organizations. In fact, throughout various
sectors of the United States economy, the organizational
separation of regulation from production and provision has
been employed as the institutional arrangement of choice —
quasi-independent and independent regulatory agencies and
commissions, and legislative bodies and committees in local,
state and national governments typically review and mandate
the safety of services and commodities produced and provided
within various industries.
If one looks at "water resources management" as though
it were one task, then the number and degree of
specialization of provision units and regulators is likely
to appear as "duplication" and "fragmentation," with several
units "each dealing with a part of the problem" (Krieger and
Banks, 1962: 74, emphasis added). On the other hand, if
"water resource management" consists of several functional
aspects, then one may anticipate some organizational
differentiation.
Water Supply Projects and Their Operation. The largest
element in the complex water economy is the "water supply
industry." It consists of publicly and privately owned
systems of varying organizational forms and sizes.
The complex water economy concept may help us to
understand the apparent paradox of a large number of small
water suppliers in an industry characterized by many
observers as involving large economies of scale. Since most
larger water systems have relied primarily on surface water
supplies, many analysts' claims about the scale economies
inherent in water supply have been based on those present in
surface water supply. Surface water projects typically do
involve large capital investments in physical facilities,
such as distribution systems to convey water from the point
of supply to the point of use, and in many cases dams and
reservoirs, facilities to exploit opportunities for low-cost
hydroelectric power generation, and facilities to ensure the
protection of aquatic life.
Some local communities and private water suppliers have
made investments in developing surface water supplies,
including the construction and operation of surface water
projects. But many surface water projects have required
attention to the scale of a watershed, which is often beyond
the scale of any one local community and contains several
communities. In some cases, regional special districts have
been created to finance and build surface water projects.
In other cases, states have designed and constructed surface
water projects. Still other projects have been financed and
built by the national government.
However, construction and operation of a surface water
project are two different functions. Throughout the western
United States, for example, while Bureau of Reclamation
projects have generated more surface water storage capacity
than the several projects constructed by the U.S. After
project construction, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has
developed a practice of turning over the operation of its
projects to irrigation districts or other local special-
purpose governments that represent the users of water from
the project (Leshy, 1983: 215).
The use of the water developed by a surface water
project is also subject to decision-making that may be
appropriately organized on a scale other than the scale of
the construction of the project, or even its operation.
Water provision decisions, decisions about how much water of
what quality to acquire at what times and for what cost,
depend on a number of factors that tend to be local in
scope.
Therefore, a number of communities of interest may
exist within the service area of a large-scale surface water
project. If they can organize representative collective
entities — associations, municipalities, special water
districts — that can bargain and contract with a large-
scale water producer or water-project operators, the water
project operator may operate as a wholesaler of water to
different communities needing different amounts at different
times, and the various communities within the service area
may function as retailers, or as users' cooperatives.
The concept of competition among entities representing
local resident water users runs counter to organizational-
integration models, and will appear to some analysts to be
"fragmentation" of decision-making, with "local parochial
interests" being pursued at the sacrifice of "the general
good" of the watershed. Nonetheless, this complex water
economy with its bargaining and contractual relationships
between providers and producers, wholesalers and retailers
is how water supply actually operates throughout the United
States, and this form of organization carries with it
possibilities for efficient and equitable water resource
management.
The Special Role of Special Districts. In some watersheds,
where existing enterprises and agencies lacked the power or
the jurisdictional boundaries (or both) to effectively
engage in conjunctive management practices such as
artificial recharge and taxes on pumping, new agencies have
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been created to fit the boundaries of the groundwater basin.
Where this has occurred, those agencies have been able to
provide replenishment and water storage services for the
interdependent users of the basin, while spreading the costs
of such activities across all users in proportion to the
benefits obtained.
Special districts are at the heart of the criticisms of
the structure of government in the United States. Their
advantages appear primarily by comparison with general-
purpose local governments. Special water districts have the
jurisdictional flexibility to cross other governmental
boundaries, cover unincorporated areas, and embrace a
natural resource boundary or a community of resource users.
Special water districts may also aid in making rational
water pricing decisions. They create opportunities for
revenue and pricing systems to be developed that (a) link
the imposition of costs to the distribution of benefits, (b)
provide incentives for efficient mix and use of services,
and (c) can make the district and its activities self-
financing. Properly empowered, special water districts
provide a framework for making water supply and management
decisions within the water-user community, removed from the
decision-making processes and financial arrangements for
other services.
Associations. Associations of water users, officials, and
professionals in the water economy have played important
roles in facilitating effective water management. These
roles generally fit two broad categories: (a) mobilizing and
organizing the community of water users, officials, and
professionals in support of management initiatives, and (b)
providing communication and dissemination of information and
technical assistance that is beneficial for water
management.
Water user associations have frequently served to
create a forum for the discussion of issues within a
community when no other equally inclusive forum existed.
Industrial users who produce their own water for their own
uses, municipal and private suppliers of water to
residential populations, citizens concerned about
environmental quality, and others may employ association
membership to avail themselves of an opportunity to discuss
the conditions and prospects of their common groundwater
supply, and possible remedial actions. Where such
associations are developed (and they have appeared
throughout the nation), they have often served as the first
step toward the development of effective water management
plans, programs, and institutions.
Regulators. The water economy is not unregulated. There
exist local, state, and federal regulators. Local public
regulators are most likely to be general-purpose local
governments overseeing the operations and costs of private
water suppliers in their area. When municipalities and
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other general-purpose local governments contract for water
supply with a private producer, the legislative body of the
general-purpose local government generally retains oversight
authority to review the actions of the contractor. Local
governments have also been actively involved in the
protection of groundwater quality and the remediation of
contamination problems where they have occurred.
The states and the national government also act as
regulators of water supply operations. States operate as
regulators with respect both to quantity and quality. Most
past federal regulation has been of water quality, although
recent recommendations and emerging trends suggest the
possibility of an enlarged role for the national government
in regulating water supply operations and management.
A Local Water Economy at Work on the Los Angeles
Coastal Plain
California has encouraged groundwater management by
local water users, usually through the combined efforts of
special water districts and water users' associations, with
the support of state agencies such as the. California
Department of Water Resources. The state has also
encouraged neighboring communities sharing similar water
resource problems to form special water districts in order
to address areawide, but substate, management challenges.
This policy has been followed in most of the inhabited areas
of southern California, and in much of better-supplied
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northern California.
Although the approach has been criticized as promoting
"piecemeal" management at best, or leaving the state's
groundwater supplies "essentially unmanaged" at worst (Knapp
and Vaux, 1982), other observers conclude that statewide
groundwater management legislation and administration have
been rationally foregone in California in light of the
degree and variety of local management initiatives and
activities. What critics see as an inadequate or
ineffective approach to groundwater management is viewed by
others as "a relatively well-developed and diverse system of
local groundwater management that has evolved on a piecemeal
basis over many years" (Lipson, 1978: 1).
Development of Groundwater Management Institutions in the
Los Angeles Coastal Plain. A lack of defined rights to
specific quantities of groundwater has presented significant
barriers to effective management of the resource. It is not
surprising, then, that among the first steps taken by local
groundwater users in areas that have developed management
schemes has been the determination of rights to specific
quantities of groundwater. In many California localities,
associations of local water users, including municipalities,
water service companies, local businesses, and agricultural
interests, were organized to discuss means by which
determinations of rights could be achieved.
Frequently, they employed adjudications in order to
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take advantage of a process that limited decision-making to
the users affected, allowed for expert investigations of
hydrologic conditions, balanced total extractions with the
available groundwater supply, and produced enforceable water
rights for the individual users. Stipulated judgments among
the parties were often used to secure mutually agreeable
allocations that might not have resulted from the strict
application of state water laws.
The conjunctive management of groundwater supplies with
local and imported surface water supplies in California
typically has also involved the creation of local water
districts with specialized functions. Such districts
provide various elements of conjunctive management —
controlling and limiting overdraft through monitoring and
enforcement, acquiring water supplies and replenishing the
underground supply and regulating water storage, and
protecting supplies from degradation. Occasionally, a water
district will provide these services by producing them
itself; in other cases, the district will act as a service
provision unit contracting with other specialist producers
of these services. An example of this system of inter-
jurisdictional relationships can be seen in the conjunctive
management of water in the Los Angeles Coastal Plain in Los
Angeles County, California.
The Los Angeles Coastal Plain is underlain by two major
groundwater basins, the West Coast Basin along the coast,
and the Central Basin inland (although the southeast corner
13
of the Central Basin extends down to the coast in the Long
Beach area). The the Newport-Inglewood Uplift, a northwest-
southeast geologic disjuncture parallel to the coast,
separates them. The West Coast Basin is recharged almost
exclusively by subsurface flow across the Uplift from
Central Basin, which in turn receives most of its
replenishment from the San Gabriel Valley upstream.
Rapid development of the Coastal Plain during the first
half of this century generated increased demands for water.
These demands were met largely by use of Coastal Plain
groundwater supplies. This resulted in declining
groundwater levels, which in West Basin sank below sea
level. Along the coast, salt water began to intrude into
West Basin, rendering water in some wells near the coast
unusable by the 1920s and 1930s. The main source of local
water supply for West Basin's coastal communities was
severely threatened.
The responses to those threats have been described in
Ostrom (1965, 1990) and Blomquist (1992). Representatives
of West Basin water users — municipalities, water
companies, local businesses — formed a West Basin Water
Association to investigate and pursue how to acquire and pay
for additional imported water supplies from MWD, and how to
gain control of the depletion problem in the West Basin.
The association operated on both problems through
different avenues — one involving special district
formation, the other involving adjudication of rights to the
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use of the groundwater supply. In working through the
adjudication, West Basin users faced complicated and
interrelated difficulties. In order to limit pumping to an
extent needed to stop the overdraft, they would have to cut
back their pumping by nearly two-thirds and replace the
difference with more expensive imported supplies. A related
problem was that raising West Basin water levels high enough
to halt sea-water intrusion would raise them along the
Newport-Inglewood Uplift to the point where Central Basin
water would no longer flow into West Basin, since
overpumping in Central Basin had lowered water levels there.
The association, the California Department of Water
Resources, and the Los Angeles County Flood Control District
(now a division of the Los Angeles County Department of
Public Works) constructed and operated a pilot project in
the late 1950s and early 1960s to create a sea-water
intrusion barrier by injecting fresh water underground to
form a pressure ridge along the coast. The project was
successful, and a full-scale sea-water intrusion barrier was
constructed. The barrier allowed water levels in West Basin
to be kept lower, thereby increasing the amount of recharge
flowing into the Basin from Central Basin and reducing the
amount by which West Basin pumpers had to cut back.
In the 1950s, Central Basin water users formed a
Central Basin Water Association and began to explore
possibilities for reducing groundwater withdrawals and
securing additional water supplies and a groundwater
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replenishment program. A Central Basin Municipal Water
District was formed and annexed to MWD in 1952, ensuring
access to Colorado River water for communities in Central
Basin. Later in the 1950s, sea-water intrusion problems
began to appear in Central Basin near Long Beach, so
overdraft created water quality problems there too.
Water users in the West and Central Basins needed to
achieve several goals that would benefit both basins: limit
groundwater withdrawals in Central Basin; raise water levels
in Central Basin and keep them lower in West Basin in order
to maximize the subsurface flow from Central Basin to West
Basin; find a means to finance and operate a replenishment
program that would benefit both basins; and find a permanent
means for financing and operating the sea-water intrusion
barrier projects.
The Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District
was formed in 1959. Once formed, it began an adjudication of
water rights in the Central Basin on behalf of the water
users. This action began in 1962 and ended with a final
judgment in 1965. At that point, water users in both basins
had enforceable rights to specific quantities of water,
which could be (and extensively have been) transferred.
Both basins were placed on a modified safe-yield operation
(technically, West Basin runs a deficit in order to maximize
the intake of replenishment water from Central Basin). A
replenishment program was implemented, involving the use of
local recharge, and artificial recharge with imported water
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and reclaimed water. Sea-water intrusion was effectively
halted through the operation of the barrier projects.
Operation of the Conjunctive Management System in the Los
Angeles Coastal Plain. The Central and West Basin Water
Replenishment District is the public provision unit that
organizes the conjunctive management program for the Los
Angeles Coastal Plain. However, the Replenishment District
has a staff of three, and shares an office with the Central
Basin Municipal Water District. The Replenishment District
provides a conjunctive-management program through a series
of contractual arrangements with specialized producers.
One might ask why the Replenishment District was
created when the West Basin Municipal Water District and the
Central Basin Municipal Water District already existed. The
West Basin Municipal Water District and the Central Basin
Municipal Water District were formed, like many municipal
water districts in California, to contract for the delivery
of surface water. Such districts generally do not have
artificial recharge programs or pumping assessments. Nor do
municipal water districts generally correspond with the
boundaries of groundwater basins; these districts typically
represent existing political jurisdictions. Municipal water
districts can be formed by the people of any county or
counties, or of any portion of a county, and may include
both incorporated and unincorporated areas. However, if any
part of a municipality is included, it must all be included.
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Therefore, neither the West Basin Municipal Water
District nor the Central Basin Municipal Water District was
in a position to finance and operate the replenishment of
the Central and West Basins. However, municipal water
districts, as specialized agents in the market for purchases
of supplemental surface waters, were ideally suited to the
acquisition of waters for recharge programs, since they
already were members and contractors with the MWD for the
importation of additional surface water supplies for their
respective communities.
The creation of the Central and West Basin Water
Replenishment District to cover the area of both
interconnected basins, with the specialized authority to
provide the replenishment and sea-water protection
functions, generated the needed jurisdictional boundary fit
and the needed authority. It was not, however, necessary to
empower the Replenishment District to acquire imported
supplemental water for recharge, or to make the
Replenishment District a member agency of the MWD, since the
two Municipal Water Districts with that authority and that
membership already existed within the territory of the
Replenishment District. The Central and West Basin Water
Replenishment District became a customer for waters secured
by the Municipal Water Districts.
The Replenishment District purchases imported
supplemental water for recharge of the groundwater basins,
and for injection against salt water intrusion, through the
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Municipal Water Districts. The Municipal Water Districts
recover their costs through water sales and property taxes.
The Replenishment District recovers its water purchase costs
through taxation of pumping, while its administrative costs
are covered by ad valorem property taxes. The theory behind
these arrangements is that the existence of a secure water-
supply infrastructure is of benefit to all property holders
in the areas covered by these Districts, while the
replenishment program primarily benefits groundwater pumpers
and their customers, and the water sales of the Municipal
Water Districts primarily benefit the water retailers of the
area and their customers. The Replenishment District also
operates an in-lieu replenishment program, financed from
pumping assessments, through which it reimburses pumpers the
difference in their costs from not pumping and taking more
expensive imported water supplies instead.
The Central and West Basin Replenishment District owns
extensive recharge facilities, but it does not operate them.
The Los Angeles County Department of Public Works has
specialized personnel with extensive experience in operating
reservoirs to impound and release waters, and it operates
the Central and West Basin Replenishment District's
spreading project in the Central Basin forebay. Similarly,
the Department of Public Works gained experience in the
operation of the sea-water intrusion barrier projects, and
so it performs the actual injection of the barrier project
water that the Replenishment District purchases.
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The Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts have
operated water reclamation plants at the Whittier Narrows
and nearby San Jose Creek for years. With the authorization
under supervision of the California Department of Health
Services, the Replenishment District purchases reclaimed
water from the Sanitation Districts for groundwater
replenishment. The Sanitation Districts release the
purchased quantities of reclaimed water to the spreading
facilities operated by the Department of Public Works for
the Replenishment Districts. Since reclaimed water from the
Sanitation Districts is much less expensive than
replenishment water imported from the Colorado River or from
northern California, the Replenishment District uses as much
of the reclaimed water as it can, and has been increasing
those amounts.
While locally reclaimed water is the least expensive
source of replenishment water, the major imported water
wholesaler, the MWD, offers surplus replenishment water at a
lower price than its treated, filtered regular water
supplies for direct delivery. Conjunctive use of
groundwater supplies lowers the demand for imported water
and reduces the amount of capacity MWD has to construct and
maintain for dry periods, so the MWD Board has encouraged
this practice through the lower price of replenishment
water. Similarly, in years when it has surplus water
available in the State Water Project, the California
Department of Water Resources has offered surplus water at
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reduced prices to local districts for artificial recharge.
Thus, each year, the Central and West Basin Water
Replenishment District anticipates the approximate mix of
surface water supplies and groundwater pumping within the
Coastal Plain (based the anticipated availability of surface
water supplies), estimates the amount of replenishment water
and barrier water needed in the Central and West Basins,
arranges the purchase of that water from several sources in
such a way as to secure the needed quantity at the least
total cost, and arranges for the operation of its spreading
facilities and barrier projects. It then assesses those
purchase and operations costs against the water users within
the Central and West Basins.
Thus, the operation of these facilities, the supplying
of the replenishment waters, and the maintenance of water
quantity and quality in the basins, are accomplished through
a local public economy featuring a network of
intergovernmental contracts with specialized producers
exhibiting a high degree of division of labor. These
arrangements have provided the Coastal Plain of Los Angeles
County with an effective conjunctive management program that
is beginning its fourth decade of operation.
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